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The Comparative Study of Integration Policies of European Cities

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1. Introduction

In the study of integration policies the national level of individual countries has been the dominant unit of analysis. In such studies the integration policies towards newcomers, or in the absence of an explicit policy, the functioning of general institutions of a society for the inclusion and incorporation of them are studied under the assumption that such a national frame sets conditions or even determines processes of integration everywhere in the country and at all levels. There is an abundance of such national case studies, often of a stock taking and monitoring nature and funded by policy agencies\(^1\). There is also an established tradition of comparative studies of countries and their integration models\(^2\).

Studies of integration processes and policies at the lower levels of cities and municipalities are more recent than national ones, but also here there are by now quite a few of the European cities that have studies made of their policies, as is testified by other contributions in this book. Systematic comparison of cities, however, is still a new field in which very little has been done as of yet. Early examples of such comparative attempts focused predominantly on the political dimension of integration and policies related to civic and political participation, as in the case of Patrick Ireland’s study of four cities in France and Switzerland (Ireland 1994), Rex & Samad (1996) on Birmingham and Bradford, Blommaert & Martiniello (1996) on Antwerp and Liege, Garbaye (2000) on Birmingham and Lille, Bousseta (2001) on Antwerp, Liege, Lille and Utrecht and Fennema & Tillie (2004) on Amsterdam, Liège and Zurich. Other comparative studies focused on specific aspects of local policy such as housing and segregation patterns in nine cities (Musterd et al. 1998), policing in Paris, Marseille and Lyon as compared to New York and Chicago (Body-Gendrot 2000), the institutionalisation of Islam in Utrecht and Rotterdam (Rath et al. 2001) or the management of diversity in the implementation of local policies in Manchester and Marseille (Moore 2001).

Attempts to do more systematic analysis on integration policies as such – not just on one aspect of it - at the local level of cities are only two: the first is the UNESCO-MOST project “Modes of Citizenship and Multicultural Policies in European Cities”

\(^1\) For an analysis of the policy-research nexus in funding research see Penninx et al. 2008

\(^2\) For a recent overview of European studies see Penninx et al. 2006.
(MPMC) that ran from 1996 till 2004. This project focused in its in depth empirical research particularly on the political participation of immigrants, but that specific focus was framed in a more general comparison of cities, their immigrants and local governmental policies. Systematic descriptions were made of 16 major European cities and Tel Aviv (see the city templates available on the UNESCO website (www.unesco.org/most) that yielded a wealth of interesting material for comparison. In two book publications (Rogers & Tillie 2001 and Penninx et al. 2004) general comparison of policies and cities were supplemented by in-depth comparisons on selected topics. Alexander (2004) used this material not only to construct a first typology of such local policies, but also to base a new in depth comparison of policies of Amsterdam, Paris, Rome and Tel Aviv on it (Alexander 2003 and 2007).

The second, more recent comparative project is the ongoing European Foundation’s project “Cities for Local Integration Policies” (CLIP) that started in 2006. While the MPMC-project had been initiated primarily by researchers, CLIP started as an initiative of policy makers: in 2006 the city of Stuttgart, the Congress of local and regional authorities of the Council of Europe and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions created a network of some 25 European cities that wanted to systematically exchange experiences on local integration policies and learn from each other. Five research institutes of the IMISCOE Network of Excellence have been engaged to make a case study in each of these cities and to do the comparative studies on these cases. The project is organised as consecutive modules in which specific aspects of local integration policy are studied empirically and compared systematically. The first module has been on housing of immigrants and the second on diversity policies in employment and service provision. Further modules are planned on inter-group relations and immigrant entrepreneurship. Each module generates some 25 case studies, one comparative synthesis report and specific policy briefs.

In general one can say that the strength of the MPMC-material lies in the general conception and framing of local integration policies, its comparative analysis and typology. In terms of content it has a strong focus on political mobilisation and participation of immigrants. In contrast, the CLIP-material focuses strongly on policy practices in particular sub-domains of integration policies (other than the political domain), enabling to study the complete chain from policy formulation, implementation and results, showing the often strong dependence of such policies on the functioning of general institutions at the local and the national level. It also gives

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3 An earlier small scale example of such an initiative is the comparative study of integration policies of Haarlem in the Netherlands, Osnabrück in the FRG and Angers in France, commissioned by the city of Haarlem: Penninx 2005.

4 IMISCOE (www.imiscoe.org) is a Network of Excellence of researchers in the domain of International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe. IMISCOE unites 23 research institutes and some 400 researchers in Europe. The five institutes involved in CLIP are European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS) at the University of Bamberg, the Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam, the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM) of the University of Liège.

5 These case studies will be available in the e-library of the European Urban Knowledge Network (EUKN): www.eukn.org. The comparative synthesis reports will be published by the Council of Europe and are downloadable at www.eurofound.europa.eu.
much more inside in the administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms involved in policy making and implementation.

In this contribution I will try to capture some of the main elements that have emerged from these earlier studies and particularly from the MPMC and CLIP-projects. In attempting to achieve this, I will not summarise the findings and conclusions of these studies and projects, but I will explore in an essay format their general messages and implications for research.

I premise my analysis on a few general observations about integration processes, their conceptualisation, and the lessons to be drawn from the empirical data. I am convinced that any integration policy should be based on thorough and systematic knowledge of processes of integration and exclusion. If policymakers are to influence or guide such processes, they need a clear overview of which instruments they can potentially use to intervene and at what particular stage in the process they should intervene. That is why I will firstly summarize some important elements of that knowledge in the next section.

Such knowledge will provide a solid starting point for policymaking, but it is not enough. The process of policymaking and policy implementation has its own logic, which does not necessarily run parallel to the logic of integration processes. I will turn to some basic notions of this logic in the third section. In the fourth section I will gradually zoom in on the local level and on the ways that cities may or may not attempt to influence integration processes by deliberate and systematic interventions. I will describe the wide diversity in such local policies, but I will also ask whether we can see convergence over time.

Finally, in the last section I will turn to national-level policies on immigration and integration, which serve as a pervasive, though not determinant context for the integration processes of immigrants and settlers in general and for local integration policies in particular. I will discuss also briefly relations between EU, national and local policies and their possible future development.

2. The empirical study of integration and exclusion processes

There is a host of literature on integration and the variety of definitions of the concept (and its equivalent like assimilation, incorporation, insertion) is endless. Many of these concepts, however, have normative elements that relate to a wished for outcome of such processes. That makes these concepts problematic in empirical studies. For empirical study of processes of integration and exclusion we need an open, analytical definition. For that reason I developed the following definition.

From the moment that immigrants arrive to settle, they have to secure a place in their new society, both in the physical sense (a home, a job and income, access to educational and health facilities) and in the social and cultural sense. Especially if newcomers see themselves as different, and are also perceived by the receiving society as physically, culturally and/or religiously ‘different’, they may aspire to gain a recognised place in the new society and be accepted there on the basis of or despite those differences. From these observations, I deduce a basic, but also comprehensive, definition of integration: the process of becoming an accepted part of society. This
elementary definition is intentionally open in two ways. First, it emphasises the processual character of integration rather than defining an end situation. Second, it does not specify any particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society, in contradistinction to the normative models developed by political theorists whether these go under the labels of assimilation, integration, multiculturalism or pluralism. It thereby leaves room for different temporal (that is, intermediate) and final outcomes. This makes the definition highly useful for the empirical study of these processes – allowing to capture more of the diversity that can be documented in cities.

This open, elementary definition of integration encompasses at least three analytically distinct dimensions in which people may become accepted parts of society: the legal-political, the socio-economic and the cultural/religious dimension. The first dimension conditions the other dimensions in two ways. From the perspective of individual immigrants, their legal position (and any related legal rights that have been allocated to them) can have significant positive or negative consequences for their behaviour and for their efforts to integrate. Factors such as extended uncertainty about future residence rights (and, in the case of asylum seekers, long-term dependence on charity or the state), and a lack of access to local and/or national political systems and decision-making processes, obviously have negative implications for migrants’ opportunities and preparedness to integrate. From the perspective of the receiving society, such exclusionary policies are an expression of basic perceptions that classify immigrants as outsiders – a mindset not conducive to the development of proactive policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domains. Exclusionary policies thus have adverse effects on integration. Turning this reasoning around, empirical studies indicate that where an inclusion of immigrants in formal and informal channels of political participation does occur, this leads to (admittedly varied) forms of proactive policies in the socio-economic domain and often also in the cultural-religious domains. Amsterdam and Birmingham are well documented exemplary cases in this respect.

Having defined the key concept of integration and its dimensions, the next question is: Who are the actors involved? There are two main parties in integration processes: the immigrants themselves, with their varying characteristics, efforts and degrees of adaptation; and the receiving society, with its characteristics and its reactions to the newcomers. It is largely the interaction between the two that determines the direction and the temporal outcomes of the integration process. However, these two ‘partners’ are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources. The receiving society, its institutional structure and its reactions to newcomers are consequently far more decisive for the outcome of the process than the immigrants themselves. Integration policies are part of the institutional arrangements of a society, especially under our broad definition that allows for the impact on immigrants of both general policies and those policies that fly an explicit flag of immigrant integration. Since such policies are defined politically by the receiving society (often by majority vote), they carry an inherent risk of one-sidedness or bias – of putting an overemphasis on the expectations and demands of society (or its dominant elements) and too little emphasis on immigrants’ opportunities for participation or on negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups themselves. In addition to the immigrants and the receiving society, a third party may also exert crucial influence on the process of integration, especially in its early phases: the country of origin, or more precisely the government or other institutions in the sending country. These may try to control the
direction and substance of their citizens’ integration process in their countries of residence.

This configuration of influences implies that processes of immigrant integration do not operate, as is often assumed, exclusively at the level of individual immigrants – with integration measured simply in terms of their achievements in housing, employment, education, and social and cultural adaptation to the new society. Integration also takes place at a second level: the collective level of the immigrant group. Organisations of immigrants are the expression of mobilised resources and ambitions, and may become an accepted part of civil society – and a potential partner in developing and implementing integration policies. Alternatively, they may isolate themselves or be excluded by the society of settlement.

A third level at which processes of integration take place is the level of institutions. Two types of institutions are of particular relevance. The first are the general public institutions of receiving societies or cities, such as the education system, institutional arrangements for the labour market or public health, or the political system itself. Such general institutions are supposed to serve all citizens, and in equal measure. They work through laws, regulations and executive bodies, but also with unwritten rules and practices. General institutions may impede access or equitable outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minorities in two ways. First, they may formally exclude them, either completely (as does the political system in most countries and cities in the case of alien immigrants) or partially (as when social security and welfare systems offer only limited services to aliens). Second, even if access for all residents including immigrants is guaranteed in principle, such institutions may hamper access or equitable outcomes by virtue of their (historically and culturally determined) ways of operating – failing to take account, for example, of specific characteristics of the migrants’ situation that are attributable to their migration history, their cultural and religious background, or their language abilities. The adequate functioning of these general public institutions – and their potential to adapt to growing diversity – is therefore of paramount importance. At this level especially, integration and exclusion are ‘mirror concepts’ (see Penninx 2001).

The second type of institutions that are of particular relevance for integration are institutions specifically ‘of and for’ immigrant groups, such as certain religious or cultural institutions. The value and validity of any group-specific institution in society, in contrast to general institutions, is confined to those who voluntarily choose for and adhere to them. Although their place is primarily in the private sphere, group-specific institutions may also manifest themselves in the public realm as important actors of civil society – as the history of churches, trade unions, cultural, leisure and professional institutions in European cities and states has shown. Some migrant-specific institutions may become accepted parts of society at an equal level to comparable institutions of native groups, but others may either isolate themselves or remain unrecognised or excluded.

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6 We use here the sociological concept of an institution: a standardised, structured and common way of acting within a given socio-cultural setting.

7 A basic thesis on policies, namely that ‘non-policy’ - i.e. not having an explicit integration policy for immigrants – is also to be analysed as a policy, follows from these observations. See also Alexander 2004.
The mechanisms operating at individual, organisational and institutional levels are different, but the outcomes on each of these levels are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements determine to a strong degree the opportunities and scope for action of organisations, and they may also exert significant influence on how immigrant organisations develop and orient themselves, as Fennema and Tillie (2004) have shown. Institutions and organisations together, in their turn, create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals. Conversely, individuals may mobilise to change the landscape of organisations, and may potentially contribute to significant alterations in general institutional arrangements. In view of the uneven distribution of power and resources noted above, such examples are scarce, but they do occur.

One more important element in the logic of integration processes has to be highlighted: the time factor. Processes of integration of newcomers are long-term by their very nature. At the personal level, individual adult immigrants may adapt significantly in the cognitive dimension of their behaviour: a pragmatic attitude of learning fast how things are done, by whom, and so on, is relatively easy and pays off quickly. The adaptation of adults in the aesthetic and normative dimensions of their behaviour, however, tends to be more difficult. Factual knowledge may change, but feelings, likes, dislikes, and perceptions of good and evil remain rather persistent across lifetimes. Though that may be a general pattern for the human race, it becomes more manifest in those who change their basic environments through migration.

The situation of the descendants of this ‘first generation’ of migrants generally differs in this respect. Although they do become familiarised with the immigrant community, and possibly its pre-migration background, through their primary relations in family and immigrant community networks, they simultaneously become thoroughly acquainted with the culture and language of the society of settlement, not only through informal neighbourhood contacts starting in early childhood, but especially through their participation in mainstream institutions, the education system in particular. If such a double process of socialisation takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies can play an important role), these second-generation young people develop a way of life and a lifestyle that combines or integrates the roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Because the ways of doing this are manifold, more and more differentiation develops within the original immigrant group. At the group level, this means that the litmus test for integration – and hence for the success or failure of policies in this field – lies in the situation of the second generation in the host society. Have its members had equal access to education, and have they shown educational attainments on a par with those of native young people?

Finally, research indicates that integration should better not be considered as a linear and unidirectional process. Although we have indicated before that the situation of the first

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8 Penninx (2000) has demonstrated the interconnectedness of integration processes at different levels by comparing how the situation of Turkish Muslims has evolved in the Netherlands and Germany. Although these immigrants migrated in the same period and for the same reasons, and had roughly the same characteristics, the policy reactions both to Islam and to the Turkish minority have differed markedly in the two countries. An interesting outcome of contrasting policies regarding Islamic organisations and specific institutional arrangements for Islam is that individual-level attitudes towards the receiving country and towards integration, particularly as gauged among young and second-generation Turks, appear to differ significantly between the Netherlands and Germany.
generation of migrants differs significantly from that of their children and grandchildren, this does not imply that 'integration' is the inevitable eventual outcome, as is often assumed or wished for. On the contrary, the literature has shown that significant setbacks may occur. The third generation is not necessarily better integrated than the second and the second than the first.

If the immigrant integration process is propelled by the interaction of two parties at different levels, as has been posited so far, and if we also allow for the differentiating effects of time and generations, what can we reasonably expect in terms of outcomes? Comparative studies provide clear answers on this point: a plurality of outcomes is the rule. A first category of studies compares the integration processes of different immigrant groups in the same institutional and policy context of a nation or city. Such studies reveal that different immigrant groups may follow different patterns of integration or incorporation. In the Dutch case, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) have shown that Moluccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Southern European, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants differ in their speed of integration and in the pathways they tend to follow. The consequence of this type of study design, however, is that the explanations found for such differences lie primarily in characteristics of the various immigrant groups, simply because the national or city context into which they are being integrated is identical.

A second category of comparative studies – cross-national ones that examine the integration of the same ethnic group in different national immigration contexts – does virtually the opposite. These studies also find differences in outcome, but attribute these primarily to the differential functioning of the context into which the group is integrated. Here, too, the differences found can be considerable, as illustrated in the comparison of the institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK in the postwar period (Rath et al. 2001), and the comparative analysis of attitudes and actions of trade unions with respect to immigration and the societal status of immigrants in seven European countries (Penninx and Roosblad 2000).

Analysis of the extensive material obtained from the 17 MPMC cities and the 20-plus CLIP cities (Bosswick et al. 2007) throws even more light on the heterogeneous nature of both parties in the integration process. Looking at the immigrants first, the backgrounds to their migration, and the selectivity involved in it, are highly variable in both time and space. Some streams in the migration flows towards Europe’s cities had backgrounds in past or present colonial relations with the country of destination, as is clearly visible in cities like Amsterdam, Birmingham, Lisbon and Marseille. Other streams can be traced back to a demand-driven migration of mostly low-skilled workers, some of it with a long history, as in Swiss, Belgian and French cities, others stemming from the post-war decades as in German and Austrian cities. And all countries and cities have received varying shares of the mixed immigrant streams of the past three decades: significant supply-driven movements of refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented immigrants, and new migrants who moved after the fall of the Iron Curtain. And most cities received these newcomers alongside highly skilled cosmopolitan professionals and company-linked migrants. The total picture reveals not only a significant widening of the diversity in immigrant origins (from predominantly European to more and more global),

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9 A recent publication gives an overview of 17 cross-national research projects funded by the EU’s TSER Programme (see European Commission 2003). It is available at http://eumc.eu.int.
but also marked disparities in the social and cultural capital that immigrants have brought with them and/or developed during their stay.

If we turn our eye to the other partner in the integration process, that of the host societies, we see that variability is also strong. The templates of the 17 MPMC cities uncovered wide variations both in their institutional settings and in their policies and responses to immigrants (Alexander 2004), as did the case reports of the 20 cities in the first round of the CLIP-study (Bosswick et al. 2007). Some of the variance can be explained by differences in the national institutional systems in which the cities are embedded. I will come back to this in more detail in the next section. In addition to such national factors, a great many local factors and circumstances can account for the high variability of local reactions and policies: local political constellations and coalitions that work for inclusion or for exclusion; the physical layout of the city and its relation with the neighbouring area (compare Paris to Berlin before 1991, or Stockholm with Copenhagen); the historical experience with earlier immigration and diversity; and the concrete instruments and resources available to local policymakers to guide processes in the vital domains of housing and urban regeneration, labour market and entrepreneurship, education and health. These and many other local factors all contribute to the dissimilarities among cities, but it is difficult to say on the basis of the available data which of them have predictive value for the emergence and orientation of immigrant policies.

3. The study of politics, policymaking and implementation

Policies are intended to guide processes in society: in our case the integration processes of immigrants. As I have argued above, we not only need thorough insights into the logic of integration processes in order to formulate and implement effective policies, we also have to get such policies politically approved and sustained over time. The logic of politics and policymaking, however, is of a very different order from that of integration processes, and it is often problematic in relation to immigrants.

In the preceding section I have formulated as a key condition for effective policies that actual long-term residence should be expressed in a suitable legal status and in opportunities to take part in politics and policymaking, especially with reference to policies that affect immigrants or ethnic minorities. As has repeatedly been observed, the existing political systems often block the way to this goal. This conundrum has been aptly illustrated by Mahnig (2004) for the cities of Berlin, Paris and Zurich. Decisions on integration policies, their content and their orientation, are taken in political systems in which the majority vote decides. Majority-minority relations, and the actual or perceived clashes of interest connected to them, are played out both at the national level and in cities. This may lead to the outright exclusion of segments of immigrant populations (as alien non-citizens) from the formal political system; or, in cases where they are partially or fully included, it may marginalise their voices. Perceptions of immigrants turn out to be significant factors in such processes – indeed often stronger than the facts (Penninx et al. 2004). This is even more the case, if the issues of immigration and the position of immigrants are turned into politicised questions. This mechanism may result either in a virtual absence of (explicit) integration policies and an avoidance of issues related to immigrants, or in one-sided, patronising policies that largely reflect majority interests and disregard the needs and voices of immigrants.
The MPMC and CLIP data on cities seems to generally confirm the working of this mechanism\textsuperscript{10}, but several case studies may also point to ways out of the conundrum. Some British cities may serve as an initial example. Since most of their immigrants are of ex-colonial origin and hold UK citizenship, the process has occurred in a basically open political system from the beginning. Although this has not prevented significant polarisation of majority-minority relations (as a wealth of literature in the UK and Garbaye (2004)'s case study on Birmingham testify), the significant concentrations of immigrants in certain districts, combined with political coalitions with powerful parties, appear to have resulted in substantial immigrant political participation in cities over the course of time. Crises in some cities have reinforced the process. Thus, it is cities, rather than nation states, that often play a leading role in developing new practices of political participation.

A different trajectory towards more political participation and inclusive integration policies is shown by some Swedish and Dutch cities. Both these countries introduced rather comprehensive integration policies at the national level in a period when immigration and immigrant integration were much less politicised: Sweden in the mid-1970s and the Netherlands in the early 1980s. These conditions promoted the early establishment of liberal, inclusive measures and policies, including the introduction of local voting rights for aliens (Sweden in 1976, the Netherlands in 1985) and easier access to naturalisation for many newcomers. Such novelties (at the time) were motivated by a conviction and awareness that forces within migrant groups would need to be mobilised to get policies accepted and implemented and to forge cohesion. Naturalisation and local voting rights were viewed as means to promote integration, rather than as a final testimony to integration achieved. The results of such policies nowadays in Dutch cities is that the large majority of immigrants and their descendants may participate in both national and local elections, that a significant part of members of parliament and city councils have an immigrant background and that the immigrant vote may actually count\textsuperscript{11}.

The interesting thing is that cities in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands not only utilised the available formal channels, but also introduced additional complementary instruments to reinforce participation. These included parallel participatory institutions for consultation (see Fennema and Tillie’s description for Amsterdam (2004) and Garbaye’s for Birmingham (2004)) and affirmative action in recruiting municipal officials and policy implementers from minority groups. Although such policies may not always have attained their goals completely, and the character of concrete measures may have changed in the course of time, such multiple modes of participation do appear to have reinforced integration, and their results seem to a certain extent irreversible. Even if both Sweden and the Netherlands have witnessed a significant political polarisation and backlash in recent years on topics of immigration and integration, these earlier attainments still make a difference. In the Netherlands, for example, the Pim Fortuijn List (LPF) – the party that put immigration and the integration of (mainly Islamic)

\textsuperscript{10} The CLIP cities are more selective, since they themselves have chosen to be part of researched cities. Even so, active participation of immigrants themselves in policymaking and implementation is not a matter of course in the majority of these cities.

\textsuperscript{11} It is interesting to note that the ‘immigrant vote’ played an important role in reversing the political situation in Rotterdam in the recent local elections of March 2006, ousting the Pim Fortuijn Party (LPF) and bringing back the Social-Democrats: see Van Heelsum & Tillie 2006.
immigrants high on the list of political issues – deliberately recruited immigrants as candidates (as all large Dutch parties had done before). It even went so far as to assign the second place after Fortuijn on its election slate to a young, successful Cape Verdean immigrant, who was consequently voted into the national parliament. In Rotterdam, where the Fortuijn list became the largest party in the 2002 local elections, a young immigrant woman became an executive councillor on behalf of this party. The essential change that has occurred politically is that the new polarisation does not run along the lines of insular in-groups and out-groups, nor completely along the right-left axis in politics.

Yet, the trajectories and achievements described above for some UK, Swedish and Dutch cities still seem exceptional in Europe as a whole. In most other MPMC and CLIP cities, the stimulating factors highlighted above have been largely absent. The question of what kinds of policies have been developed in these cities, and when, seems to depend heavily on the urgency of the situation. Crisis situations have often precipitated actions and policies that strongly and disproportionately reflect the perceptions and interests of locally dominant groups.

As integration policies are carried out in practice, another aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges. In contrast to the long-term nature of integration processes discussed above, the political process in democratic societies requires that policies bear fruit within much shorter time frames – the spaces between elections. Unrealistic promises and demands that arise from this ‘democratic impatience’ – the political desire to achieve quick solutions for problems and processes of a long-term character (Vermeulen & Penninx 1994) – often produce backlash. A vehement debate on the alleged failure of Dutch integration policies that takes place since the early years 2000 is a good example.12

More difficult than democratic impatience, however, are situations in which a political climate of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments – translated into political movements and a politicisation of the topics of immigration and integration – prevents well-argued policy proposals from being adopted. Unfortunately, such situations have emerged in a number of European countries and cities, with the Zurich case study (Mahnig & Wimmer 2001) as an extreme example. This implies that far more attention must be given to ways of framing immigration and integration policies politically to make them acceptable to the governing political system.

All preceding observations relate to the political process – which may or may not yield integration policies. I will now add some observations concerning the form and content of those policies that have already been introduced. First of all, as I have indicated earlier, integration policies are of necessity context-bound. This is implicit in the question: Into what are immigrants supposed to integrate? At the level of states, differences between countries in the ideologies and practical models they apply in incorporating immigrants have received quite systematic attention (see e.g. Bauböck et

12 It is interesting to note that that debate in the Netherlands is predominantly a debate on the national level and on a rather abstract level. Local authorities and policy practitioners have partly ignored or even resisted it. The consequences for policy reorientation have focused largely on a few highly symbolic topics of national policy, like the civic integration courses, mandatory regulations to do these courses and learn the Dutch language, culture norms and values, and, of course, more restrictive admission policies (see Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2007).
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al. 1996; Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1998; Favell 2000; Freeman 1995; Guiraudon 1998; Hammar 1985; Soysal 1994). Beyond such specific, migrant-related differences, however, the general characteristics of states and societies also matter. In the socio-economic sphere, integration mechanisms in societies with a strong liberal market orientation (and limited welfare and social facilities) differ from those in the caring welfare states that put more emphasis on solidarity and redistribute much greater proportions of the national income. In the cultural and religious domain, too, historical particularities in institutional arrangements create wide differences in the feasibility of policies in certain areas, as was illustrated earlier. As a consequence, the scope, the actors and the instruments of policy action may differ significantly between countries.

The context-bound nature of integration policies has been clearly illustrated by Vermeulen (1997), who compared immigrant policies in five European countries since the 1960s. He basically demonstrates that the actual content of each country’s integration policies is highly dependent on the pre-existing institutional arrangements in the relevant domains within the country in question. Countries that traditionally recognised different languages or religions within their territories, for example, generally found it easier to make additional provisions for newcomers in those domains. In a similar vein, Vermeulen and Slijper (2002 and 2003) have analysed the practice of multicultural policies in Canada, Australia and the USA. Multiculturalism was found to differ not only in terms of its historical development in each of these countries, but the practice of multiculturalism also was clearly context-bound.

Although both these examples pertain to the level of states, the same rule applies at the city level, as is shown by the comparative analysis of MPMC cities by Alexander (2004). The first comparative report of the CLIP cities (Bosswick et al. 2007) that focused on segregation and housing policies makes abundantly clear that general institutional arrangement at the national and local level do influence significantly policy opportunities and outcomes: the characteristics of the housing market and their actors, the tax structure at the national and local level, general housing policies and its regulations and facilities, etcetera.

4. Divergence or convergence in city policies?

When studying empirical data on local immigrant integration policies and their evolution over time, the question arises as to whether the wide variation in policies and approaches have generally persisted or increased, or whether there are tendencies towards convergence. In the MPMC and CLIP data and in the foregoing sections of this contribution, we have found indications for both such trends. I will explore this question further by bringing together evidence and arguments more systematically, first examining the variation and the mechanisms of divergence, and then identifying elements and mechanisms of convergence.

At first glance, the evidence for variation and divergence predominates in the empirical research material. In the first place, local politics, political participation by immigrants, and multicultural democracy varies greatly between the cities studied (see the city templates of the MPMC project, the publication by Rogers and Tillie (2001) and the chapters by Mahnig, Garbaye, Fennema and Tillie, Marques and Santos and Moore in Penninx et al. (2004)). This variability is attributable above all to
differences between local political systems and how they operate towards immigrants. Indications of bottom-up mobilisation of immigrants that have been an important factor for changes in opportunity structures for immigrant participation are few and far between.\textsuperscript{13}

In their turn, such local variations in institutional arrangements and participation opportunities may be explained to a significant degree by the wide variety of national policies, institutional settings and citizenship paradigms that underlie them – as the body of cross-national research cited above indeed suggests. Embedded as cities are in their national contexts, they necessarily reflect national policies and paradigms. We can illustrate this using the findings on the widely varied political ‘problem definitions’ that are applied with respect to immigrants and their integration, and on the resultant strategies and their manifestations in policy.

One basic citizenship paradigm classifies immigrants in principle as aliens and outsiders who are only temporarily present in society. In this exclusionary paradigm, the society in question emphatically does not regard its territory as an immigration country, and hence considers migrants to be temporary ‘guests’. At best, measures are taken to make that temporary stay comfortable and profitable for both parties, and to facilitate the migrants’ anticipated return home. No logical ground whatsoever exists for inclusive policies that would incorporate the immigrants as citizens or political actors. Such an exclusionary definition of immigrants results in the kinds of policies that Alexander (2004) has designated in his typology as either ‘non-policy’ or ‘guest worker policy’. Forms and instruments of such policies are varied and arbitrary, being largely ad hoc reactions to immediate problems.

In contradistinction to such exclusionary approaches, we also encounter citizenship paradigms that include immigrants as a matter of principle, at least in the course of time. In terms of how such inclusion is envisaged, however, we can identify two distinct political definitions of immigrants and their integration. The first is prototypically formulated in the French republican model. In this conception of the state, its relationship to the citizens, and the corresponding political system and public institutional arrangements, the distinction between citizens and aliens is crucial. Alien immigrants should ideally become citizens, thus gaining recognition as individual political actors. Immigrant collectivities (whether made up of citizens or not) are not recognised as political actors. French republican terminology shows a strong tendency to avoid notions like ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘multiculturalism’ which suggest collectivity and difference on any basis, be it origin, culture, religion or class. Equality at the individual level, at least in a formal sense, is the overriding political principle. This paradigm essentially depoliticises the issue of immigrants and their integration (although this has not kept immigration from becoming a dominant issue for the established parties).

The second inclusionary paradigm is the Anglo-American one. Immigrants are likewise expected to have or take up citizenship individually, but after they do, the political system leaves considerable room for their collective manifestations and actions. Ethnicity and ethnic minorities are perceived as relevant notions – even to the extent of

\textsuperscript{13} In Sweden and the Netherlands such opportunities were created early, but not primarily as a result of pressure from immigrants themselves.
officially recording the overall population in terms of ethnicity in censuses. Although equality is also an important principle in this political conception, there is a supplementary notion that substantive equality may be dependent in practice on membership of cultural, ethnic, immigrant or disadvantaged groups. Political struggle between groups on issues of multiculturalism is thereby an explicit part of politics (irrespective of the outcomes).

The internal logics of the two inclusionary citizenship paradigms culminate in differing strategies for integration policy. In principle, the first paradigm generates strategies that favour generalised, group-neutral policies, formal equality within the existing system as a priority, an avoidance of designating specific target groups, and a non-recognition of collective manifestations and organisations as important actors or influences. The inherent problem in such an approach is how to mobilise and engage forces from within immigrant groups in the implementation of policy, given that such forces are simultaneously feared as hindrances to integration. Strategies under the second paradigm are more inclined to designate target groups and formulate group-specific policies, which may even sanction ‘positive discrimination’ or affirmative action. They tend to recognise, if not stimulate, forms of representation for minority groups, as by providing direct grants to immigrant organisations, or supporting them indirectly by subsidising certain activities. They are also more inclined to reconcile equality with cultural difference, implying a recognition of cultural and religious aspects of integration processes.

I have intentionally presented these two models of inclusion as contrasting paradigms in order to clarify their internal logic. In practice, one can observe many variations and eclectic bricolages of elements of both approaches in the definitions and instruments of policies pursued in European cities. Alexander (2004)’s typology elucidates this. Such variations may even be seen within a single city over the course of time, as the Amsterdam case study has revealed (Fennema & Tillie 2004).

Differences in national, local or other types of contexts may result in policy divergence and in a plurality of integration policies, so runs the argument in the preceding section. But what picture emerges if we bring together the evidence and arguments for convergence?

To begin with, let me come back to the argument that the embeddedness of cities in national contexts and policies can significantly influence local policies. Such a logic would imply at least two conditions. The first is that no convergence is taking place between nation states. This is clearly not the case. A number of cross-national studies have identified forms of convergence, albeit hesitant and partial ones. Vermeulen (1997: 150-152) highlighted several developments that indicate at least some degree of convergence. First, with regard to immigration policies, and in particular the aspects that regulate the residential status of immigrants from non-EU countries, the European Commission has issued a series of directives in recent years aimed at harmonising member state policies. Second, some convergence has also occurred in naturalisation policies. For example, the sharp disparities between French and German legislation and practice in this field have narrowed in recent years. The jus sanguinis element in German legislation has been relaxed and the jus soli principle introduced to facilitate children of immigrants in gaining citizenship, while in France the traditional jus soli principle has lost ground. Studies by Weil (2001) and by Hansen and Weil (2001) on methods of
adjudicating nationality for aliens have confirmed this convergent tendency on a wider scale in Europe\textsuperscript{14}. Thirdly, Vermeulen also detected some convergence in the use of a common terminology, which is particularly encouraged by supranational organisations. He warned, however, that such a common vocabulary of ‘integration’ and ‘multiculturalism’ may be deceptive: ‘Using the same words does not necessarily mean people agree in their ideas. It could even serve to create an illusion of agreement’ (Vermeulen 1997: 152).

The second condition for national-level dominance of local policy would be that national policy has a more or less determinant effect on what cities do and can do. Here the empirical data on cities, and especially comparisons of cities within one national system, speak a different language: the specific histories and forms of local policies in Berlin, Frankfurt and Cologne in Germany, the policy initiatives in Zurich, Bern and Basel of the late 1990s in Switzerland, and the shifting policy orientations in Roubaix, Toulouse and Marseille in France cannot be explained by an embeddedness in the national system. True as it may be that embeddedness is in general a relevant and significant factor for local policies, these and other case examples show that national influence is often less determinative for what cities do than has frequently been suggested. Not only do cities make differential use of their existing discretionary power within a national system – as illustrated for example by Berlin’s more lenient implementation of naturalisation legislation as compared to the rest of Germany – they may also embark on new elements and forms of policy for immigrants, putting general policy settings to use in group-specific ways. The ways in which some French cities have used the national-level Politique de la Ville as a framework to pursue immigrant policies without calling them by that name is an illustration of the latter mechanism (Moore 2001 and 2004).

Clearly there are specific forces at work at the local level that produce policy convergence. One of these stems from the strongly localised character of immigrant settlement itself. Whatever their specific institutional arrangements are, local governments have to find answers to the same questions, such as how to provide their immigrants with adequate housing and jobs, how to make educational and health facilities available, and how to respond to immigrant demands for fulfilling religious obligations or obtaining facilities to use and teach their mother tongues. Local governments also have to deal with very similar reactions by native populations to immigrants, and with processes of discrimination and social exclusion. Neglecting and avoiding such questions is easier at the more distant level of national policy; in cities, the issues are concretely felt, especially as the numbers of immigrants and their concentrations in certain districts increase. If city authorities do not address such questions on their own initiative, they may be forced to do so by outbreaks of violence. ‘Inner-city riots’ as they are often called in the UK, or the problèmes des banlieues in France, are triggers that can bring about new or different policies for and by cities. In this sense, such crises may function sometimes as bottom-up forces for convergence.

A logical consequence of such area-specific events as ‘policy triggers’ is that the ensuing policies are often spatial policies, in which housing, immigrant concentration

\textsuperscript{14} For a recent comprehensive overview of developments related to Acquisition and Loss of Nationality within the EU see the publications of the NATAC-project: Bauböck et al. 2006a and 2006b.
and segregation are central issues. The Inner-City Policies in the UK since 1968 and the Politique de la Ville in France since the 1990s illustrate this.

Such forces not only hasten the emergence of policies and influence their content, they also encourage similar types of strategies for policy implementation. In some cities, consultation with immigrants and engagement of immigrant individuals and organisations in policy implementation was part of the policies from their inception, as Moore (2001) has reported for Manchester. If that is not the case, however, it often soon becomes clear that effective implementation will be impossible without engaging the immigrant groups themselves in both policy formulation and implementation. The Marseille and Toulouse studies by Moore (2001; 2004) aptly illustrate how the authorities in both cities found informal ways of linking into immigrant groups by recruiting mediators from them. The Oeiras study in Portugal (Marques & Santos 2004) illustrates another form for resolving the same problem: though not recognising immigrant status or ethnicity as relevant criteria, the Town Hall of the municipality of Oeiras simply works via existing neighbourhood, sport and leisure associations that happen to be mainly immigrant organisations. These and other examples suggest that the conditions for effective implementation demand a certain convergence in the strategies applied, even though their forms may differ.

Having summed up the evidence and arguments in favour of the divergence and convergence theses separately, how should we now weigh up the balance, particularly with an eye to possible future developments? Before doing this, let me first specify what convergence means. Vermeulen has made some pertinent observations on this point: “We have already noted some similarities between countries, and we have pointed out that what differences do occur are confined to a rather narrow band of variation. But similarities do not yet mean convergence. To find out whether countries are converging we have to show that the similarities are increasing” (1997: 150). He goes on to make a categorical distinction between ‘parallel development’, caused by external developments, and convergence, which refers to internal changes in systems. ‘The notion of convergence – different lines approaching one point, diminishing differences – must be distinguished from the notion of parallel development. We speak of parallel development when countries pass through the same general stages of development. In parallel development, many similarities can be seen in the past, but not the same ones as today’ (Vermeulen 1997: 150). Parallel development may hence create favourable conditions for convergence, but it does not necessarily produce it.

Using this distinction, how can we size up the present situation and what can we expect in the future? Firstly, we observe that parallel developments in European cities are strong. There may be temporal differences, since the northwest-European cities were confronted earlier with mass immigration arising from globalisation, while south-European cities and those in Norway, Ireland and Finland started to receive immigrants later. However, recent immigration to both types of cities is largely comparable in its diversity, as we have noted earlier. This creates a fertile ground for convergence, primarily because mechanisms of policy formation and implementation at the local level tend to result in similar responses and pragmatic solutions, and because the need to mobilise forces within immigrant groups to effectively implement policies also leads to comparable strategies. Pressure is also mounting from supranational organisations in

15 An empirical, practice-related indication for this theoretical claim is seen in the growing direct contacts
general, and from the gradual accumulation of practical experience surrounding EU policies in particular, which compels cities towards harmonisation. The future certainly seems to be one of increasing convergence.

Yet the picture that emerges from empirical material is still largely one of a plurality of policies. As Alexander (2004) has shown in his overview of MPMC cities and Bosswick et al. (2007) for the CLIP participants, many cities still find themselves in phases of non-policy or ad hoc policy reactions. Cities that can build on longer traditions of proactive integration policies—including quite a few cities in countries where national policy has never encouraged such local initiatives—show more signs of cross-national convergence. The two paradigmatic variants of immigrant inclusion that I outlined above have become more difficult to recognise in their current policy practice.

5. Integration policies in Europe: pressures for renewal?

European states are still predominantly trying to address international migration through a framework based essentially on nation-state premises. In such a framework, the world is divided into separate political communities with their own national citizens and territories. Migration across political borders is an anomaly in such a system. As a consequence, migration policies have been largely defensive and control-oriented rather than proactive (Martiniello 2006); integration policies for immigrants have often been reactive, if not altogether absent. These two approaches reinforce each other: the lack of a consistent, transparent immigration policy is an obstacle to effective integration policies. In turn, the lack of consistent integration policies, and a (real or perceived) stagnation of integration processes amongst newcomers of increasingly diverse origin, give rise to predominantly negative perceptions of migration and of immigrants—hence reinforcing the defensive policies on immigration.

Such a situation now obtains especially in the north-west European countries with longer post-war traditions of immigration. The problematique is reflected in the cumbersome process of introducing migration and integration policies at the EU level. EU-wide migration policy (as agreed in the Amsterdam Treaty) is often perceived as running counter to national interests, or even as a threat: ‘If we have more lenient immigration policies than our neighbours, the Netherlands will become the waste pipe of Europe,’ as one Dutch politician graphically put it. The inherent danger is that EU policies will boil down to the lowest common denominator of the countries involved. The consequence of such perceptions of immigration policies is that the integration policies at the EU level thus far have largely been restricted to negative formulations: combating exclusion, racism, xenophobia or discrimination. In most member states, substantive and comprehensive integration policies are lacking, with a few exceptions as noted above.

between European cities in network organisations, such as Eurocities, and in networks designed specifically to exchange information and best practices on integration policies, such as ELAINE (European Local Authorities Interactive Network on Ethnic Minority Policies) and Quartiers en Crise. CLIP is one of the most far reaching example of such new network. Direct exchanges of policy experience and expertise between cities are also multiplying. The Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies in Amsterdam, for example, has assisted delegations from Austrian, French, Swiss, Danish, Swedish, Spanish and Norwegian cities that arrived to explore policy practices in Dutch cities.
Formulated in this way, the picture is indeed gloomy. On a more positive note I see two significant forces at work that may contribute to a way out of the stalemate. The first is the ongoing economic and political integration within the European Union. Although this may have worked negatively during the first, non-policy phase, reinforcing the defensive policy spiral by opening up borders within the Union, the awareness has since grown that common, comprehensive and proactive policies for migration and integration offer the only realistic solution. Both the problems of unsolicited immigration today and the future problems of demographic decline and competition for immigrants with needed skills can only be handled effectively within a common EU frame. Along such lines, the earlier political declarations in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and at the 1999 Tampere Summit are now being gradually followed up by frameworks for comprehensive, proactive policies, as in the EC Communications on a Community Immigration Policy (European Commission 2000) and on Immigration, Integration and Employment (European Commission 2003). The latter Communication defined the integration as follows: “it is a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-countries nationals and host societies that foresee the immigrant full participation”. Integration is conceived as a “balance of rights and obligations”. The holistic approach targets all dimensions of integration (economic, social and political rights, cultural and religious diversity, citizenship and participation).

In November 2004, the Council of Minister responsible for integration agreed on The Common Basic Principles (CBP) for integration thereby establishing a common framework for a European approach to immigrant integration. The document is meant to serve as a reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies. It was followed in 2005 by agenda for integration\textsuperscript{16}, the publication of two “Integration Handbooks” which describe practical implementation policies for the integration of migrants, and by the establishment of a new Integration Fund that can also be used by local actor of integration activities.

A reason for modest optimism is furthermore that newer immigration countries in the EU, not hindered by long traditions of reactive national policies in this field, are acting as a significant supportive force for such EU initiatives. The Greek EU presidency bore witness to this at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit. Admittedly, the process is slow and will require at least several more years of debate and negotiation, but the steps already taken are likely to act as catalysts for future new policies in member states.

The second major force for change in national policies comes from within the countries themselves. As the empirical data shows time and again, cities are the places where globalisation becomes visible, both in its overall consequences and in terms of the changing urban populations. New immigrants that arrive as a direct or indirect effect of globalisation tend to settle in cities, and local politics and policies have to cope with the consequences. This may spark tensions between the national arena and the local one, culminating in greater pressure to adopt comprehensive national-level integration policies. Such pressure may take different forms. In countries like Switzerland, Germany and Austria – where national integration policies have been late, piecemeal or nonexistent – the pressures to formulate adequate policies and the

\textsuperscript{16} Communication (2005) 389 final 1.9.2005 “A common agenda for integration”
claims for greater responsibilities and resources have come from the cities. Zurich, Bern and Basel, for instance, took initiatives for local policies (Leitbilder) in the late 1990s, prompted by the utter absence of policies at the Swiss national level. Berlin, Frankfurt and Vienna had already taken such steps earlier in response to a similar lack of national policies and resources.

In countries where national-level integration policies were launched rather early, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, the tensions take a different form. The Dutch and Swedish cities were confronted with heavy pressures on essential institutions such as the housing system (segregation and degeneration of neighbourhoods), the labour market (disproportionate unemployment, high social benefit costs) and the education system (concentrations of ethnic minority pupils in certain areas and sectors), as well as on public order (racial harassment, crime, inter-group tensions). These cities joined forces to demand more executive power and greater resources from their national governments to cope with such problems. In the Netherlands and Sweden in recent years, generalised policies targeting metropolitan areas and integration policies specifically targeting immigrants have been bundled together, formally at least, into a single framework, thus conceivably creating new, wider-ranging possibilities.

Common to all such cases is that the existing tensions often generate a critical dialogue between cities and national governments on issues where national and local policies clash. Such clashes may relate to different views of how to handle illegal migrants, on access to facilities and services in the domains of employment, housing, education and health, on the financing of integration facilities, or again on other issues. Cities will not always win such battles. At the same time, it is known that city governments use their discretionary powers – avoiding national public debate when possible – to gain more room for manoeuvre in support of certain immigrants. What such clashes make clear – and this is the broader message – is that the interests at stake in integration policies and their implementation may substantially differ, or be perceived as different, at local and national levels. At the city level, the confrontation with the day-to-day consequences of immigration is far more direct, and the implications of policies are more immediately felt, especially by immigrants. Any serious attempts by local government to cope with the problems, or – expressed more positively – to maximise the opportunities inherent in immigration, are sure to bring pressure to bear on the higher, more abstract and paradigmatic national level. A significant proportion of the European metropolises and cities is increasingly aware that they need long-term, consistent integration policies in order to preserve their viability as community entities and their liveability for all their residents. Many have realised that the continued absence of such policies is a recipe for disaster. Initiatives such as CLIP testify to this.

The preceding observations suggest also a more normative conclusion about the relationship between local, regional, national and supranational policies that deal with immigrant integration. In my view, cities should be allotted considerably more resources, instruments and latitude to act in ways they deem appropriate in their local circumstances. National policies – and by implication EU immigration and integration policies – should set out general frameworks and guidelines. One of their primary aims should be to make instruments and resources available that legitimise and facilitate local policies and actors in their efforts to achieve immigrant integration. The real work has to be done locally, and it must be performed creatively by
coalitions of actors on the local stage. It is at the level of neighbourhoods, city
districts and cities that this cooperation will be forged. And that is where the benefits
will first become visible.

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